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Argumentation is a crucial component of our lives. Although in the absence of rational
debate our legal, political, and scientific systems would not be possible, there is
still no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Furthermore,
classical theories of argumentation are normative (i.e., the acceptability of an argument
is determined by a set of norms or logical rules), which sometimes creates a dissociation
between the theories and people’s behavior. We think the current challenge for psychology
is to bring together the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation. In this article,
we exemplify this point by analyzing two cases of argumentative structures experimentally
studied in the context of cognitive psychology. Specifically, we focus on the slippery slope
argument and the ad hominem argument under the frameworks of Bayesian and pragma-
dialectics approaches, respectively. We think employing more descriptive and experimental
accounts of argumentation would help Psychology to bring closer the cognitive and
normative accounts of argumentation with the final goal of establishing an integrated area
of research on the psychology of argumentation.
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TOWARD AN EXPERIMENTAL ACCOUNT OF
ARGUMENTATION
Argumentation is a crucial component of our lives since in
the absence of rational debate our legal, political, educational,
and even scientific systems would not be possible (Mercier
and Sperber, 2011). Although psychology has studied several
aspects of argumentation, such as its role in social engagement
(Means and Voss, 1996), in learning and education (Asterhan
and Schwarz, 2007, 2009; Mercer, 2009; Howe, 2010), and in
the construction of knowledge (Mason and Santi, 1994; Leitão,
2000, 2008; Schwarz, 2009), there is still no integrated area of
research on the “psychology of argumentation” (Hornikx and
Hahn, 2012). Recently, Hornikx and Hahn (2012) have employed
this concept for encapsulating both theoretical and experimental
accounts that mutually inform separate research communities
studying human reasoning and argumentation.
Furthermore, although classical theories of argumentation
have been devoted to understanding argumentative processes
both in academic and daily-life contexts, there is no common
theoretical ground between these theories. For instance, rhetoric
considers argumentation to be a tool for persuading the audience,
whereas dialectics consider argumentation to be the quintessence
of a critical discussion aiming to determine the acceptability
of a particular stance or point of view (Wenzel, 1990). Despite
these theoretical discrepancies, for both rhetoric and dialectics
the acceptability of an argument is determined by a set of
norms or logical rules which allow classifying an argument as
veridical or fallacious, i.e., the so-called normative approaches for
argumentation.
We think the current challenge in front of psychology is to
bring together the cognitive and normative accounts of argumen-
tation. In order to achieve this, we claim that the psychological
mechanisms of argumentative processes should be investigated
by employing more descriptive and experimental accounts. In
line with this idea, recent work has started to examine empiri-
cally the descriptive, psychological aspect of classical argumen-
tative fallacies. In particular, modern approaches for studying
argumentation such as Bayesian theory (Hahn and Oaksford,
2007; Corner and Hahn, 2009; Corner et al., 2011), the pragma-
dialectical account (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; van
Eemeren et al., 2009, 2012), epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al.,
2010), and evolutionary psychology (Sperber and Mercier, 2012),
have proposed plausible explanations for the mechanisms and
cognitive aspects of argumentation in more ecologically valid
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contextual accounts. In this article, we show how these descriptive
approaches shed light onto the psychological mechanisms of
argumentation.
Here we analyze experimental evidence of two classical argu-
mentative structures. Specifically, we focus on the Bayesian anal-
ysis of the slippery slope argument and the pragma-dialectical
analysis of the ad hominem argument. We think that further
experimental research in the area is needed to increase the dialog
between argumentation theory and cognitive psychology and thus
provide a step toward an experimental account of argumentation.
CASE 1: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT
The slippery slope argument is an argument from consequences
traditionally conceptualized as an informal fallacy (Walton, 1992).
The argument starts by considering an execution of a seemingly
harmless action. The argument exhibits how the implementation
of the action would inevitably lead to an undesired or detrimental
consequence. Then, a conclusion is reached that aims to avoid the
undesired consequence. Here is an example of a slippery slope
argument:
“The government should not negotiate with terrorists (1). Once the
government starts considering terrorists as valid interlocutors (3), we
will start having dozens of new terrorist attacks (2).”
We can see from this example that the structure of a slippery
slope argument can be defined by three core aspects: (1) an
initial decision intuitively acceptable; (2) a “case” or “situation”
evaluated as unacceptable or dangerous; and (3) a process or
mechanism by which violating the initial decision would facilitate
the occurrence of that “case” or “situation” (Rizzo and Whitman,
2003).
In argumentation, the structure of the slippery slope argument
has raised the question of its highly successful implementation
in contexts in which a subject or a group of subjects attempts
to persuade the audience in favor of an argument even when
the argument or its usage are incorrect. In particular, cognitive
psychology has initiated the investigation of the mechanisms
underlying persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument by
employing the cognitive concept of similarity and statistical tools
from Bayesian theory (Corner et al., 2011).
SIMILARITY AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT: A BAYESIAN
APPROACH
Similarity is the cognitive process of perceiving objects as a global
unity when they share similar physical characteristics and as dif-
ferent objects when they do not (Tversky, 1977). Thus, similarity
represents one of the main “grouping” principles in psychology.
The classical approach in cognitive psychology assumes that con-
cepts can be represented in a common problem space in which
they are depicted as points in that space. Then, similarity is oper-
ationally defined as the distance between concepts (i.e., points) in
that space. Objects that are psychologically more similar would be
closer than ones that are dissimilar (Tversky, 1977).
Recent experimental evidence from the study of informal
fallacies and decision making have shed light on the psychological
mechanisms of the slippery slope argument by employing the
notion of similarity (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Corner and
Hahn, 2009; Corner et al., 2011). Specifically, this line of research
has tested the hypothesis that the more similar the antecedents
in an argumentative chain are, the more persuasive (or slippery)
the slope will be. In other words, the mechanism underlying the
acceptance of a slippery slope argument would be related to the
degree of similarity between the antecedents of the argumentative
structure.
In the last years, this hypothesis has been tested under the
Bayesian account of argumentation (Corner et al., 2011). This
approach considers fallacies as inductive conditional arguments
in which the strength of the argument depends on the proba-
bility of the precedent actually preceding the consequent. These
probabilities are determined by previous experience. In the case
of the example described above, the argument is convincing when
the conditional probability of the government negotiating with
terrorists (i.e., antecedent A) is high due to the increase in terrorist
attacks (i.e., consequent C). Then the calculation of the prob-
ability is P(C|A). Thus, the conclusion consists of negating the
antecedent since the antecedent has a negative utility. The under-
lying mechanism fixing the relevant probabilities for the model,
i.e., P(C|A), follows the continuous change of boundaries—as in
distance in similarity between the categories. Then, accepting the
antecedent in a slippery slope argument makes us prone to accept
the consequence. In other words, accepting one element (i.e.,
antecedent—talking to terrorists) as part of a category (i.e., the
consequence—terrorist attacks) would lead us to accept another
element (i.e., negotiating) as part of the same category.
Corner et al. (2011) proposed a psychological mechanism
of the slippery slope argument consisting of the re-appraisal of
category boundaries based on the similarity or closeness between
items in conceptual space. The rationale is that classifying an
item a under a category F increases the probability that a further
item b will be classified under the same category F. The authors
employed a type of argument that allows to calculate similarity
in the context of a decision making task. Thus, the experiment
comprised of deciding whether action A should be carried out or
not. In one example, participants had to decide whether an area is
eligible or not for the status of “Outstanding Natural Beauty” by
considering its inhabiting species. For instance:
Scarathon is home to 224 species of large animals.
Sellenfeld is home to 179 species of large animals.
Decision: Eligible for Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
status.
In these experiments, participants were asked to make a cat-
egorization decision of their own (i.e., whether Sellenfeld was
eligible for the Outstanding Natural Beauty status), based on the
information they had just read. The experiments were designed
to demonstrate that the evaluation of a slippery slope argument
is directly related to the re-appraisal of categorical boundaries.
Specifically, the information was presented either as a catego-
rization task, or as decision-making task. Experimenters showed
that when a and b are similar, identical items a lead different
groups of participants—regardless of whether they performed a
categorization or a decision-making task—to evaluate slippery
slope arguments as strong and to categorize new items, b, as F,
when a had been categorized as F. However, this did not happen
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when a and b were dissimilar. When a had been categorized as F
and a and b were dissimilar, the same participants, who initially
rejected categorizing b as F, re-appraised this decision on being
told about an intermediate item c that was similar to b, and that
was also categorized as F.
These results show that when both the beginning and end of
the argumentative chain of a slippery slope argument are similar,
the probability that both were perceived as belonging to the
same category is higher and hence the persuasive strength of the
argument is stronger. These results suggest that the persuasive-
ness of the slippery slope argument is due to the concatenation
of antecedents/evidence and consequences/reasons that are per-
ceived as similar.
In conclusion, the above study shows how the concept of
similarity and probabilistic tools of cognitive psychology can
be used for shedding light on an old philosophical problem in
argumentation, i.e., the problem of the persuasiveness of the
slippery slope argument. This line of research suggests that an
evidence-based, descriptive approach can be useful to move for-
ward the traditionally more normatively oriented discussions of
the Argumentation field.
CASE 2: THE AD HOMINEM ARGUMENT
A second classical argumentative fallacy that has initiated some
empirical investigation is the ad hominem argument. In an “Ad
hominem” argument, it is the person who makes a statement
rather than the veridicality of the statement that is attacked by
the opponent. In other words, the proponent of a statement is
targeted instead of the statement itself (Walton, 1998). Accord-
ing to van Eemeren et al. (2012), there are three variants of
this fallacy: “(a) an abusive variant of ad hominem, in which
the other party’s person is attacked directly by depicting them
as stupid, bad, or unreliable, (b) a circumstantial variant, in
which the other party is attacked indirectly by casting suspicion
on their motives, and (c) a tu quoque variant, in which the
other party is attacked by pointing out a contradiction in their
words or between their words and their deeds” (p. 347). Recent
experimental research (van Eemeren et al., 2009) has shown that
participants’ judgments of how reasonable an ad hominem fallacy
is are a function of the strength of the argument that targets
the proponent. Thus, the abusive variant of the ad hominem
argument is judged as the most unreasonable and the tu quoque
as less so.
The fact that experimental subjects judge the abusive ad
hominem as an unreasonable discussion move raises the question
of why is it that this fallacy occurs as often in argumentative
discourse (i.e., oral and written) without it being recognized as
a fallacy by the audience. In other words, the unreasonableness
of this fallacy is easily recognized in experiments but in real life
situations this fallacy remains undetected more often than not.
Recently, this question has been tested from a pragma-dialectical
perspective using the concept of “strategic maneuvering” (van
Eemeren et al., 2012).
PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND “STRATEGIC MANEUVERING”
Recent work in argumentation theory has started to empiri-
cally test the psychological concerns about the extent to which
people are prone to employing procedural norms in rational
argument rather than focusing solely on normative issues as tra-
ditional argumentation research does (van Eemeren et al., 2009).
These studies have been conducted under the so-called pragma-
dialectical account of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst, 2004). While strictly logical approaches are focused on the
study of arguments as ready-made products, pragma-dialectics is
developed to study the different kinds of procedural rules that
define reasonable argumentation. Following this approach, the
ad hominem argument is viewed as fallacious specifically because
it violates fundamental procedural norms of rational arguments
and not solely because it violates a particular norm or logical rule
(as in normative theories).
Recently, pragma-dialectics has incorporated elements from
rhetoric into experimental analysis of ad hominem argument
(van Eemeren et al., 2012). In particular, the authors have raised
questions regarding the nature of “strategic maneuvering” from
a pragma-dialectical perspective. “Strategic maneuvering” uses
“the opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering
the discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own
interest best” (p. 151). Thus, strategic maneuvering enables the
parties to maintain the persuasiveness in the discussion without
neglecting the standards of the argumentation. This approach
has been studied recently in the cognitive field of argumenta-
tive structures such as the ad hominem argument (van Eemeren
et al., 2012) and the straw men fallacy (Lewin´ski and Oswald,
2013).
TESTING THE ABUSIVE AD HOMINEM ARGUMENT USING STRATEGIC
MANEUVERING
van Eemeren et al. (2012) studied the factors contributing for
an abusive ad hominem attack to look less unreasonable. The
authors describe the abusive ad hominem attacks as a mode of
strategic maneuvering which takes on a reasonable appearance
in real-life situations by mimicking legitimate critical reactions
to authority argumentation. Thus, they hypothesized that the
abusive ad hominem attack would be judged as less unrea-
sonable when it is presented as a critical questioning of the
authority exerted by the party under attack. In other words,
abusive ad hominem argument (i.e., clearly fallacious) may be
disguised as instances of non-fallacious versions of this argument
form.
This hypothesis was tested in two experiments where par-
ticipants saw a group of situations that included a contextual
description followed by a dialog between two speakers. The
instruction was to judge how reasonable or unreasonable they
found the discussion contribution of the second speaker in the
dialog by means of a 7-point scale. Importantly, in the contextual
description of the dialogs, the first speaker was presented as
knowledgeable about the topic under discussion.
In the first group of dialogs, an abusive ad hominem argument
in disguise was included, where, the first speaker never argues by
exerting authority. Since the arguer does not present themselves
from a position of authority, these situations are referred to as
disguised ad hominem argumentation. The next is an example of
such an abusive ad hominem attack, presented as criticism to the
authority in disguise:
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The art museum is renovated and that is the reason why it has
been inaccessible to the public for some time. The museum curator
discusses this with a journalist.
Curator: I think the museum can be open again for the public.
The building is in excellent shape now and it is perfectly safe.
Journalist: As a curator you may know about art but you are not
knowledgeable about the safety of the building (p. 359).
Importantly, a group of dialogs containing a reasonable per-
sonal attack were included in the experiment. In those, a stand-
point is defended by means of authority argumentation in which
the speaker refers to themselves as an expert. Then, the sec-
ond speaker replies by making a critical reaction to the rele-
vant authority argumentation. The following is an example of
a reasonable personal attack as a justified reaction to authority
argumentation:
A divorce lawyer is talking with a friend about a criminal who is
under trial
Divorce lawyer: I really think that this man will be charged with
at least 12 years. As a lawyer I know these things.
Friend: You are a divorce lawyer not a criminal lawyer. Why
should I believe you? (p. 359)
As predicted, the authors found that abusive ad hominem
arguments were scored as less unreasonable in disguised dialogs as
compared to situations where the first speaker refers to themselves
as an expert. In fact, while the abusive attacks were judged as an
unreasonable argumentative move when the arguer had exerted
authority, their counterparts in situations where the authority was
disguised were considered neither reasonable, nor unreasonable.
In conclusion, when the ad hominem argument is presented
as a criticism to straightforward arguments of authority, it is
perceived to be less reasonable. This study shows that pragma-
dialectical account is starting to take into account more contex-
tual, ecological and daily-life settings for studying argumentation
experimentally. This approach stands in contraposition to the
classical Argumentation research, which focuses solely in norma-
tive issues.
DISCUSSION
PSYCHOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION AS AN INTEGRATIVE SCIENTIFIC
ACCOUNT
In this article, we have focused on the Bayesian analysis of the
slippery slope argument and the pragma-dialectical analysis of
the ad hominem argument in order to exemplify the merits of the
experimental approach for describing the cognitive mechanisms
of argumentation.
However, a general point to clarify is whether psychology of
argumentation is either (a) a new perspective on argumentation,
combining both normative and descriptive elements, or (b) a
descriptive approach in opposition to the normative stances of
logic, rhetoric, and dialectic. We claim that psychology of argu-
mentation is an integrative scientific account. It is neither a new
perspective nor a combination of perspectives. In fact, psychology
of argumentation possess descriptive elements and also recognizes
the necessity of normative accounts when, for instance, epistemic
vigilance (see Sperber et al., 2010; Mazzarella, 2013; Padilla Cruz,
2013) is required as a consequence of the effectiveness of certain
fallacies.
The quest for a more complete explanation of the concept
of fallacy in order “to bring the normative dimension better into
relation with the psychological dimension” (Walton, 2010, p. 160)
is not new. For instance, Walton (2010) explores the possibility
of elucidating the misleading nature of many informal fallacies
of reasoning in terms of their connections to cognitive heuristics
(Walton, 2010; but see also Correia, 2011). Walton’s approach
postulates argumentative heuristics without using recent cogni-
tive psychology research to support his view. A heuristic is a
mediating concept between the notion of fallacy and ‘retractable
argumentation’ (Walton, 2010). To explain this mediating role,
Walton introduces the notion of a parascheme, a device that can
be used to represent the structure of a heuristic as a fast inference
instinctively linking a conclusion, and that is commonly used to
make decisions (Walton, 2010).
In this light, producing a fallacy is not about doing something
inherently “wrong,” but rather the result of not selecting the
optimal strategy given the circumstances. A genuinely cognitive
explanation of fallacies, therefore, must not only explain how
these biases operate, but also specify the conditions under which
they operate and become argumentatively and epistemically dis-
advantageous (Oswald and Maillat, 2011). Oswald and Maillat
(2011) hence argues that the study of fallacies also needs a norma-
tive dimension, which helps identify clear criteria to distinguish
consistent from fallacious arguments.
For Mercier and Sperber (2011) the role of argumentation
is not truth seeking, but rather helping defend a point of view.
In other words, argumentation plays essentially a psychological
function. Still, quite a few argumentation theorists sustain the
opposite view. For example, Morado (2014) states that “if a bad
argument is convincing [it] is precisely because it appears to help
find the truth.”
Mercier and Sperber (2011) consider the evolution of reason-
ing is linked to the evolution of human communication. Reason-
ing allows humans to produce arguments to convince recipients
in accepting or trusting what they are told. And at the same time,
it allows recipients to assess the strength of these arguments and
accept valuable information that would otherwise be suspicious
(Mercier and Sperber, 2011; as a cautionary side note, see Navar-
rete and Santamaría, 2011 for a comment on why such evolu-
tionary arguments should be treated with special care). Despite
the obvious relevance of cognitive perceptions to the study of
argumentation, research on cognitive aspects of reasoning (and
by extension those of argumentation) has traditionally been kept
within the limits of cognitive psychology, from Wason seminal
works in the 1960s (Wason, 1960, 1966) and the pioneering work
of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on cognitive heuristics.
In this sense, Mercier and Sperber (2011) proposal is close to
that of the rhetorical perspective to argumentation. It understands
argumentation as a natural process of persuasive communication
(Wenzel, 1990). Sperber et al. (2010) argue that humans “have a
set of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, at risk of being
misinformed by others” (p. 359). These cognitive filters are taken
to monitor incoming information and calibrate confidence in
their source while simultaneously evaluating the consistency of
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the message. Such a role is akin to the fallacies associated with
the source in a theoretical framework in which the rhetorical
effectiveness is seen as a product of cognitive limitations and
biases (Hart, 2011; Oswald and Maillat, 2011).
To summarize, the psychology of argumentation could be
defined as a research program involving a dual-process account
of reasoning and Bayesian reasoning representation systems as
models that provide an explanatory framework for interpreting
the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacies. Fallacies can be character-
ized by the kind of consequences that lead to epistemic vigilance
(Sperber et al., 2010). Hence, we can differentiate the psychology
of argumentation as a separate field as opposed to a particular
cognitive approach, or a philosophical logic-based and apriorist
stance against the preponderance of the evolutionary grounded
search for truth.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE
ACCOUNTS OF ARGUMENTATION
In Argumentation, the mechanisms underlying persuasive argu-
ments have been traditionally studied by employing philosophical
accounts (e.g., rhetoric, dialectics, and logics). Furthermore, these
philosophical accounts have traditionally postulated models of
argumentation based on an idealization of the phenomena (Hans-
son, 2007). Thus, we can distinguish two types of idealization: (1)
a “simplified idealization” which neglects several relevant aspects
of real life complexity; or (2) a “perfectionist idealization” which
attempts to satisfy higher rationality standards than those that are
actually affordable by real agents.
Following this idea, the type of idealization of the norma-
tive approaches would fit in the first category, i.e., a simplified,
reductionist idealization. Since their theoretical distinctions are
made on a constrained, normed language (e.g., the “fallacious”
character of an argument is because it violates a logical rule),
normative views neglect the cognitive complexities of the agents
involved in a real, spontaneous argumentative discussion. Here,
we have shown how cognitive models and probabilistic tools are
starting to take into account these complexities by embracing a
more analytical and descriptive account of argumentation.
The experimental account we advocate here is in line with the
so-called “practical approach of logical reasoning” of Gabbay and
Woods (2003). The idea of a practical logic of reasoning is based
on the description of a set of behavioral aspects of practical agents
under particular cognitive conditions. In Gabbay and Woods
(2003) words:
A cognitive agent is a being capable of perception, memory,
belief, desire, reflection, deliberation, decision and inference. A
practical cognitive system is a cognitive system whose cognitive
agent is a practical agent in our sense, that is, an individual. A
practical logic gives ‘a certain kind of description’ of a practical
cognitive system. (p. 7)
In this view, a cognitive system can be defined as a 3-tuple:
a cognitive agent, cognitive resources, and cognitive tasks per-
formed dynamically in real time. This 3-tuple represents a plausi-
ble cognitive model for describing argumentative structures such
as the slippery slope argument and the ad hominem argument.
First, a cognitive agent or agents are present (the speakers).
Second, these agents perform a task in real time by evaluating
the persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument or the degree
of unreasonableness of the ad hominem argument (e.g., they
are being influenced by perception, memory, beliefs, desires,
deliberation, decision, and inference). Third, other cognitive tasks
are involved in the evaluation process, such as comparing the
similarity between antecedents in an argumentative structure in
the case of the slippery slope (Corner et al., 2011); or judging
a personal attack as less unreasonable when the ad hominem
argument is presented as criticism against arguments by hidden
authority (van Eemeren et al., 2012).
The above model allows for what Woods (2013) called the
“naturalization of logics.” The two main components of this
research program are heavy-equipment mathematics, i.e., more
powerful mathematical techniques available for representing
knowledge (e.g., the formalisms of normative theories); and cog-
nitive models promoting a naturalist description of the argu-
mentative phenomena (e.g., the Bayesian and pragma-dialectics
experimental accounts).
In terms of our proposal, this approach is particularly useful
since it represents a potential common framework in which
cognitive and normative accounts in psychology can converge.
CONCLUSION
Here we show how descriptive approaches can shed light on the
psychological mechanisms of argumentation by analyzing exper-
imental evidence related to two classical argumentative struc-
tures. Furthermore, we argue that psychology of argumentation
provides an integrative scientific perspective unlike normative
or aprioristic approaches. This integrative approach brings a
wide swath of aspects of psychological literature (e.g., emotions,
decision making) into a single comprehensive framework, re-
conceptualizing classical rationality in a framework that allows for
experimental testing (e.g., using Bayesian theory). All in all, we
believe employing more descriptive and experimental accounts of
argumentation would help Psychology to “keep on” bringing the
cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation closer, with
the final goal of establishing an integrated area of research on the
psychology of argumentation.
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